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SETTING A HIGHER STANDARD: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE WAKE OF ADARAND
David W Case*
This dispute regardingthe appropriatestandardof review may strike some
as a lawyers'quibble over words, but it is not.1
I. INTRODUCTION

In the present-day civil rights arena, no subject kindles more fundamental disagreement in legal or political debate than affirmative action.2 Not surprisingly,
the tone and tenor of this national debate has intensified exponentially following
the United States Supreme Court's June 1995 decision in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena.' Adarand holds that federal affirmative action programs utilizing
racial classifications must be reviewed under the same standard - strict scrutiny
- previously made applicable to state and local measures in City of Richmond v.
JA. Croson Co.4 In other words, racial classifications imposed by any federal,
state, or local affirmative action measure are constitutional only if "narrowly tai5
lored" to serve a "compelling" governmental interest.
Adarand's holding came despite the Court's not-so-distant 1990 decision in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,' mandating only intermediate scrutiny in
reviewing the constitutionality of federal affirmative action programs. This rapid
reversal of Metro Broadcasting'smore deferential standard underscores the
* The author is a partner in the law firm of Ott & Purdy, P.A., Jackson, Mississippi. B.A. 1985, J.D. 1988,
University of Mississippi; LL.M. 1993, Columbia University. Law Clerk to Judge Rhesa H. Barksdale, United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1991-92.
1. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
2. See Kenneth Jost, After Adarand, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 70 (In 1995, "[a]ffirmative action emerged
almost overnight as the country's hottest political issue."). Accord Lara Hudgins, Comment, Rethinking
Affirmative Action in the 1990s: Tailoringthe Cure to Remedy the Disease, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 815, 816 (1995)
("Affirmative action is one of today's most debated and divisive issues."). Such comments, however, merely
echo innumerable similar observations made over the last three decades. As Justice Brennan noted well over
twenty years ago, "[flew constitutional questions in recent history have stirred as much debate, and they will
not disappear." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 350 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Debate over affirmative action has indeed "not disappear[ed]," nor is such debate likely to disappear within the foreseeable future.
The scope of this article, however, is limited to discussion of the impact of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), upon the Supreme Court's decades-long debate over judicial standards of equal protection review in affirmative action cases. The continuing, and voluminously charted, debate over the proper role
of race conscious affirmative action remedies in achievement of the important, but somewhat enigmatic, goal of
legal, political and economic equality for citizens of all races is beyond the scope of this Article. For an interesting discussion of the nebulous concept of equality as it relates to constitutional equal protection guarantees,
see Note, Forty Megahertz and a Mule: Ensuring Minority Ownership of the Electromagnetic Spectrum, 108
HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1995) (attempting to demonstrate a libertarian conception of equality in the Court's equal
protection decisions), and Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104
HARV. L. REv. 40 (1990) (contrasting the individualistic conception of equality against the collectivist or grouprights conception of equality).
3. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
4. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). SeeAdarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
5. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
6. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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Court's increasingly conservative shift in attitude toward affirmative action.
Without doubt, Adarand calls into serious question the constitutionality of
numerous, ongoing federal affirmative action programs.7
Adarand elicited an immediate reaction at the highest levels of national government. Less than two weeks following the decision, Attorney General Janet
Reno announced that guidelines would be issued to all federal agencies requiring
review of federal affirmative action programs in the light of Adarand a On June
28, 1995, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel released a 37-page
memorandum, signed by Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, setting
forth "preliminary legal guidance on the implications of" Adarand for use in
"assessing the constitutionality of [current] federal affirmative action
programs".' Further, on July 19, 1995, President Clinton delivered a speech on
affirmative action at the National Archives, which emphasized that "we must,
10
and we will, comply with the Supreme Court's Adarand decision." In conjunction with his speech, the President issued a memorandum to all executive department and agency heads directing an evaluation of their affirmative action programs consistent with the Justice Department's previously released Adarand
guidelines.11
The comprehensive review of federal affirmative action programs triggered by
Adarand has already had significant impact. In late October 1995, the

7. See, e.g., Tena Jamison, Is it the Beginning of the End for Affirmative Action?, 22 HUM. RTs. 14, 14
(1995). When former Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole inquired early in 1995 concerning the number of
federal statutes and regulations relating to affirmative action, the Library of Congress' Congressional Research
Service furnished him a list of some 160 then-current provisions. Jost, supra note 2, at 75.
8. Ann Devroy, Reno to Issue Policy Guidelinesfor FederalAffirmative Action, WASH. POST, June 23, 1995,
at Al.
9. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to General Counsels (June 28, 1995)
(copy on file with author).
10. President Bill Clinton, Speech on Affirmative Action at The Rotunda National Archives (July 19, 1995)
(transcript on file with author). In specific regard to Adarand, President Clinton stated that:
we must, and we will, comply with the Supreme Court's Adarand decision of last month. Now, in
particular, that means focusing set-aside programs on particular regions and business sectors where
the problems of discrimination or exclusion are provable and are clearly requiring affirmative action.
I have directed the Attorney General and the agencies to move forward with compliance with
Adarand expeditiously.
But I also want to emphasize that the Adarand decision did not dismantle affirmative action and
did not dismantle set asides. In fact, while setting stricter standards to mandate reform of affirmative action, it actually reaffirmed the need for affirmative action and reaffirmed the continuing existence of systematic discrimination in the United States.
What the Supreme Court ordered the federal government to do was to meet the more rigorous
standard for affirmative action programs that state and local governments were ordered to meet several years ago. And the best set-aside programs under that standard have been challenged and have
survived.
Today, I am directing all our agencies to comply with the Supreme Court's Adaranddecision, and
also to apply the four standards of fairness to all our affirmative action programs that I have already
articulated: No quotas in theory or practice; no illegal discrimination of any kind, including reverse
discrimination; no preference for people who are not qualified for any job or opportunity; and as
soon as a program has succeeded, it must be retired. Any program that doesn't meet these four principles must be eliminated or reformed to meet them.
Id.
11. Memorandum from President Bill Clinton to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (July 19,
1995) (copy on file with author).
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Department of Defense announced the suspension of its so called "rule-of-two,"
which had been applied to all Department contracting business since 1987.12
Under the rule,13 where a reasonable expectation existed that at least two qualified small and disadvantaged businesses would bid on a contract, only small and
disadvantaged businesses were permitted to compete for that contract.1 4 The
Justice Department determined that this set-aside measure could not survive the
strict scrutiny required by Adarand.1 ' The suspended "rule-of-two" had previously resulted in over $1 billion in federal contracting business for minorityowned firms in 1994 alone.1" As the federal government continues its review in
the wake of Adarand, numerous other affirmative action programs or measures
may be subject to either elimination or substantial modification. 7
This Article will provide an overview of the primary Supreme Court decisions
affecting federal affirmative action, including a discussion of the two prior precedents overturned by the Adarand Court. An examination of the facts and holding
of Adarand will follow, including an analysis of the vastly divergent views
expressed by an extremely fractured Court. Finally, this Article will briefly
address the questions left unanswered by the Adarand majority and the resulting
uncertainty surrounding future application of strict scrutiny to federal affirmative
action programs.

II.

FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PRIOR TO

Adarand

Affirmative action decisions have historically presented the most striking
example of the wide ideological gulf often separating individual Justices on the
Supreme Court. 8 These deep divisions are perhaps best reflected in the exceedingly difficult time the Court has had in reaching consensus on the appropriate
12. Ann Devroy, Rule Aiding Minority Firmsto End, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1995, at Al.
13. See 48 C.F.R. § 219.501 to .508-70 (1995).
14. Devroy, supra note 12, atAl.
15. Devroy, supra note 12, atAl.
16. Devroy, supra note 12, at Al.
17. See generally William T. Coleman III, Adarand and Its Aftermath: How the Supreme Court
Overestimated Precedent and Underestimatedthe Impact of Its Decision, 31 PROCUREMENT LAw. 12, 13 (1996)
("[tihere are literally billions of dollars tied up in [Department of Defense] contracts that may be affected by the
holding of" Adarand).
On May 23, 1996. the Clinton Administration released a proposed plan, developed by the Justice
Department, to completely overhaul affirmative action in federal contracting to comply with the strict scrutiny
standard of Adarand. Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26042
(1996). This proposal is intended to form the model for subsequent amendment of the affirmative action provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. In an
effort to demonstrate the compelling governmental interest required by Adarand, the Justice Department conducted a preliminary study - The Compelling Interestfor Affirmative Action in FederalProcurement: A
PreliminarySurvey - which appears as an appendix to the department's proposed plan. Id. at 26050. The study
asserts that the evidence collected by the Justice Department "to date" concerning racial discrimination in federal procurement "reflect[s] ongoing patterns and practices of exclusion, as well as the tangible, lingering
effects of prior discriminatory conduct." Id. at 26051. As discussed infra, Adaranddoes not specifically identify
what will constitute a "compelling" govemmental interest justifying the continued use of race-based affirmative
action by the federal government. Therefore, the Justice Department's conclusion that a compelling governmental interest exists justifying further affirmative action in federal procurement is virtually certain to be the subject of future court challenges.
18. See Douglas 0. Linder, Review of Affirmative Action after Metro Broadcasting v. FCC: The Solution
Almost Nobody Wanted, 59 UMKC L. REv. 293, 293-94 (1991).
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level of equal protection review in affirmative action cases. Indeed, although the
modern debate over affirmative action has raged for well over three decades,19
the Court's previous attempts to articulate applicable standards in this area have
been strongly criticized as "fragmented," "inconsistent in result," and "arbitrary
in application."2
As emphasized by Justice Stevens in dissent, Adarand represents only the third
time the Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of a federal affirmative action program. 2 In both of the first two cases, Fullilove v. Klutznick22 and
2 3 the Court upheld the affirmative action measure while
Metro Broadcasting,
sharply differing over the level of scrutiny to be applied in analyzing the petitioners' equal protection claims. In contrast, the Adarand majority pretermitted decision on the constitutionality of the program in question and chose, instead, to
conclusively resolve only the standard of review issue. For better or worse, therefore, it appears that, at least for the moment, a majority of the current Court has
indeed reached consensus on the requisite level of equal protection scrutiny for
all affirmative action cases.
Resolution of this highly contested issue, however, should not be viewed solely
in the vacuum of the Adarand Court's many fragmented opinions. Indeed,
Adarand represents an end product of a quite lengthy and, at times, virulent
debate among numerous Justices, many of whom are no longer on the Court. To
fully measure Adarand's impact on this debate, therefore, this conflict must be
seen in its historical context.
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke24
The Court's 1978 Bakke decision is said to have "set the structure for all future
discourse on affirmative action."25 Bakke involved an unsuccessful white applicant's equal protection challenge to a University of California Medical School
admissions program setting aside sixteen positions, out of one hundred total, for
which only minority applicants could qualify.26 The fragmented opinions in
Bakke aptly forebode the debate which would span decades over the appropriate
analytical framework for review of race-conscious affirmative action measures.
Although voting 5-4 to strike down the University's minority admissions program, the Bakke voting majority failed to agree on a rationale. Of those voting
to invalidate the program, only Justice Powell, author of the primary Bakke opinion, utilized an equal protection analysis. Justice Powell asserted that any racial
classification, even those designed to benefit or protect minorities, is suspect and
19. See Hudgins, supra note 2, at 819-21.
20. See Lucy Katz, Public Affirmative Action and the FourteenthAmendment: The Fragmentationof Theory
after Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 17
T. MARSHALL L. REv. 317, 318 (1992).

21. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2126 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
23. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
24. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. Katz, supra note 20, at 329. See generally Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell
Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REv. 21 (1979); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A ConstitutionalAnalysis,67 CAL.
L. REv. 69 (1979).
26. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274-76 (1978).
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thus subject to strict scrutiny review under the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
Although carefully acknowledging that, under some circumstances, race could
positively factor into admissions decisions, Justice Powell found that Bakke's
absolute set aside could not survive strict scrutiny and, therefore, violated the
equal protection clause.28 While concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, found it
unnecessary to reach the petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment claim. Instead, they
found the race-based exclusion at issue invalid solely under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.29

In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun,
found strict scrutiny review inappropriate because the benign race-conscious
measure in Bakke implicated no fundamental right or suspect classification."
The dissenters argued that, instead, only intermediate scrutiny should apply to
the University's admissions policy, which they would have upheld as substantially related to an important governmental objective."1 Of the Justices reaching the
issue, therefore, only one of five favored strict, rather than intermediate, scrutiny.
Nevertheless, Justice Powell's Bakke opinion is clearly the genesis for the Court's
current majority position applying strict scrutiny to all race conscious affirmative
32
action programs.
B. Fullilove v. Klutznick
In its first opportunity to address the constitutionality of a federal affirmative
action measure, the Court again was able to reach a majority decision only for
27. Id. at 290-91.
28. See id. at 315, 317. In this regard, Justice Powell suggested in Bakke that the goal of obtaining the educational benefits flowing from a racially diverse student body may be a "compelling" governmental interest in
higher education justifying limited race-conscious classifications. Id. at 311-16. In a recent case involving the
University of Texas School of Law, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unequivocally rejected this proposition:
[A]ny consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell's argument
in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented the view of a majority of the Court
in Bakke or any other case.
Hopwood v. State, 78 E3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). Reaction to the Fifth
Circuit's Hopwood decision was immediate and vehement. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Ruling Threatens
College Policies on Racial Entries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at Al, Col. 3 ("some scholars and affirmativeaction supporters said the [Fifth Circuit] had dangerously exceeded its powers in rejecting the Supreme Court's
Bakke decision"); Editorial, Bad Law on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at A 14, Col. I (criticizing Hopwood as "hasty, aggressively activist and legally dubious"); Mari J. Matsuda & Charles R. Lawrence,
Myths About Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at A 13, Col. 1 ("The court's decision drastically limits affirmative action at public universities within the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction and if sustained could sound the death
knell for affirmative action programs around the country."). Initial frenzy over the potential consequences of
Hopwood to race-conscious affirmative action measures aside, the Fifth Circuit correctly observed in Hopwood
that Justice Powell's equal protection discussion in Bakke represented the opinion of only one Justice, and, as to
the arguments concerning "diversity" as a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, has never been adopted by a
majority of the Supreme Court. As such, Justice Powell's Bakke opinion could not under any circumstance be
construed as binding on the circuit courts. The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in Hopwood on July
1, 1996. Whether Hopwood's rationale will be followed or rejected by other circuits remains to be seen.
29. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
30. See id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
31. Id.
32. See Katz, supra note 20, at 331.
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the ultimate result, not the underlying rule of decision. The Fullilove Court
voted 6-3 to uphold the "minority business enterprise" (MBE) provision of the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, requiring utilization of at least ten percent of federal funds for local public works projects to procure services or supplies from minority-owned firms.3 ' Again, the critical division in the various
opinions was over the necessary level of equal protection review. 4
Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment in Fullilove in a plurality opinion joined by Justices White and Powell. 3 ' Although upholding the MBE provision against an equal protection challenge, the plurality opinion expressly avoided the standard of review debate initiated in Bakke. 31 Indeed, as Justice Powell's
separate concurrence observed, the Chief Justice's opinion failed to "articulate
judicial standards of review in conventional terms. '37 As commentators have
subsequently recognized, the Fullilove plurality nevertheless applied a standard
of review "somewhere between" strict scrutiny and a traditional form of interme38
diate review as advocated in Bakke.
Although stressing the MBE provision's "strictly remedial" nature, the plurality
opinion asserted that any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria "must necessarily receive a most searching examination. ' 39 This "searching examination,"
however, must be tempered by "appropriate deference to Congress" in discharge
of its authority under the spending and commerce powers, and under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce constitutional equal protection guarantees
by appropriate legislation.4" Indeed, the plurality opinion is, to say the least, an
ardent declaration of deference to congressional judgment even where "a congressional program raises equal protection concerns."41 In the many subsequent
justifications for various positions in the Court's renewed standard of review
debate in Croson, Metro Broadcasting,and Adarand, this aspect of Fullilove's
plurality opinion attracted the most attention and, not surprisingly, the most conflicting interpretations.42 Further, Fullilove's strong separation of powers lan-

33. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1980). Albeit under contrasting rationales, Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell, White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun voted to uphold the MBE provision.
34. For a substantive discussion of Fullilove's impact upon this country's continuing legal and political
debate over affirmative action, see Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1986).
35. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453.
36. See id. at 492 ("This opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as [Bakke]. However, our analysis demonstrates that the MBE provision would survive
judicial review under either 'test' articulated in the several Bakke opinions.").
37. Id. at 495-96 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 18, at 299 (emphasis in original).
39. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 481, 491.
40. Id. at 472. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that Congress has the "power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. For a discussion on the reach of
Congress' § 5 power, see Jesse H. Choper, CongressionalPower to Expand Judicial Definitions of the
Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1982); and Archibald Cox,
ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion ofHuman Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966).
41. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472. For example, the plurality opinion states that, "[w]hen we are required to
pass on an Act of Congress, we assume 'the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.'" Id. (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)). "[W]e accord[ ] 'great weight to the decisions of Congress' even though ...a congressional program raises equal protection concerns." Id.
42. See, e.g., infra notes 59-67, 70-71, 76-78, 80-81, 88-95, and accompanying text.
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guage43 may explain, at least in part, Justice White's decision to join the plurality
and abandon the intermediate standard of review position he previously joined in
Bakke."
In his separate concurrence, Justice Powell, as he had in Bakke, subjected the
MBE provision to strict scrutiny.45 Based upon the deference he afforded congressional enactments under the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Justice Powell found the MBE set-aside "a reasonably
necessary means of furthering the compelling governmental interest in redress'
In another concurring
ing the discrimination that affects minority contractors."46
opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, also voted
to uphold the set-aside, but argued the equal protection claim should be reviewed
under intermediate scrutiny as articulated by the dissenters in Bakke.47
As did Justice Powell, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist also subjected the MBE
provision to strict scrutiny, but in dissent argued that the set-aside must be rejected under this standard.48 Justice Stevens also dissented from the judgment in a
separate opinion, but failed to set forth a clear position on the standard of review

43. "[W]e are bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to Congress, a co-equal branch
charged by the Constitution." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472. "Here we pass, not on a choice made by a single
judge or a school board, but on a considered decision of the Congress and the President." Id. at 473. "Here we
deal... not with the limited remedial powers of a federal court, for example, but with the broad remedial powers of Congress. It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more
comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress, expressly charged with the Constitution with competence
and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees." Id. at 483.
44. See supra text accompanying note 30. Much has been made through the years of Justice White's seeming unpredictability in race cases and, in particular, affirmative action cases. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Essay in A
Tribute to JusticeByron R. White, 107 HAR. L. REv. 20, 20-23 (1993). See also Lance Liebman, Justice White
and Affirmative Action, 58 U. COLO. L. REv.471, 473-87 (1987) (attempting reconciliation of Justice White's
opinions on race and affirmative action). As former Solicitor General Fried has noted, however, one "thread of
continuity" in Justice White's work on the Court was his unwavering commitment to a strong constitutional
separation of powers doctrine. Fried, supra at 23. Without question, Justice White often provided the decisive
vote in critical affirmative action decisions, joining without comment seemingly inconsistent opinions from one
case to the next. See Fried, supra at 20; Neal E. Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a
Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REv. 125, 125 n.6 (1990). See infra note 83 and accompanying text. Justice White's
vote in each such decision, however, is best understood when viewed in the light of his long-standing commitment to separation of powers and his concomitant respect for the politically responsive, legislative authority of
Congress, a constitutionally charged co-equal branch of the federal government. Cf Rhesa H. Barksdale, Essay
in A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARv. L. REv. 3, 6 (1993) (Justice White's "opinions reflect his
unwavering confidence and faith in our majoritarian, democratic system. He understands the limited role of the
courts, especially the federal courts, in that system, feeling confident that the affairs of our nation are best managed by its people and their elected representatives.").
45. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 507 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 510, 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). However, as current Solicitor General Drew Days,
who argued Fullilove before the Supreme Court on behalf of the United States, has cogently observed:
The efforts [in Fullilove] to delineate the appropriate test for evaluating the constitutionality of
racial classifications ran from Justice Powell's 'strict scrutiny' to Chief Justice Burger's 'most
searching examination' to Justice Marshall's 'substantially related to an important governmental
objective.' The truth is, however, that all the members of the majority applied a standard that fell
below any of the ones upon which they claimed to rely. In the absence of any significant legislative
history, these Justices looked to a variety of congressional reports, hearings, and legislation related
to the general condition of minority business enterprises. On this basis, they wrote their own post
hoc rationalizations, concluding not that Congress 'could reasonably have' relied, but in fact that
Congress did rely, upon this societal condition in enacting the minority set-aside.
Drew S.Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 467-68 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
48. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 522-23 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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issue.49 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens observed that the equal protection clause
imposed upon the Court "a special obligation to scrutinize any governmental
decisionmaking process that draws nationwide distinctions between citizens on
the basis of their race. 50 However, Justice Stevens carefully noted his disagreement with Justices Stewart and Rehnquist that the equal protection clause
absolutely prohibited any statutory classification based on race.51
C. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
In 1989, the stakes in the ongoing standard of review debate were raised considerably when, for the first time, a majority of the Court subjected an affirmative action program to strict scrutiny review. 52 Croson involved a Richmond,
Virginia ordinance requiring prime contractors on city construction projects to
subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of each contract to minority-owned businesses.5 3 Relying primarily upon Fullilove, both the trial court
and the original appellate panel upheld the ordinance against an equal protection
challenge, determining the city was entitled to deference similar to that accorded
Congress in Fullilove. 4

The Croson Court voted 6-3 to invalidate the Richmond set-aside program. 5
Five members of this majority - Justices O'Connor, White, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist - concluded that strict scrutiny was the applicable standard of equal protection review.55 In a separate opinion concurring in part and
conc r-ng in the judgment, Justice Stevens, similar to his dissent in Fullilove,
again stubbornly refused to "engag[e] in [the] debate over the proper standard of

49. See id., 448 U.S. at 532, 550-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Stevens further emphasized that "(riacial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification." Id. at 537.
51. Id. at 548.
52. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989). Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment); Id. at 551 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Charles Fried, Affirmative Action after City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the Scholars'Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155, 155 (1989) ("For the
first time a majority of the Court holds unequivocally that all racial classifications ... must pass strict scrutiny
and be justified by a compelling governmental purpose."); Michel Rosenfield, Decoding Richmond:
Affirmative Action and the Meaning of ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1731 (1989) ("[A]
majority on the Court for the first time has settled on a single standard--the strict scrutiny test."). Only three
years earlier, in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986), a plurality of the Court, consisting of Justices Powell, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, had applied strict scrutiny to a public
employer's voluntary affirmative action plan challenged under the equal protection clause.
53. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-79, 486.
54. Id. at 483-84. Following the intervening W4ygant decision, the Supreme Court remanded Croson to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration. On remand, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit
struck down the city ordinance finding strict scrutiny review applicable based on Wygant. Id. at 485.
55. Id. at 476.
56. Id. at 493-94; id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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review to apply in affirmative-action litigation." 57 Instead, Justice Stevens joined
only that portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion finding the city had presented

insufficient evidence justifying the need for a race-based remedy for past dis58
crimination in its construction industry.
In a portion of her opinion garnering only a plurality vote, Justice O'Connor,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, also directly addressed the
contention that review of the city's set-aside program should be controlled by
Fullilove, which upheld a similar set aside program imposed by Congress on
local construction projects utilizing federal funding.9 The plurality rejected this
notion, finding Fullilove clearly distinguishable as primarily based upon
Congress' "unique remedial powers" under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6" Under section 5, "Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the
Fourteenth Amendment."61 Giving substance to this federal-state dichotomy,
Justice O'Connor emphasized:
That Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions are
free to decide that such remedies are appropriate. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is an explicit constraint on state power, and the States must undertake any remedial efforts in accordance with that provision. To hold otherwise
would be to cede control over the content of the Equal Protection Clause to the

50 state legislatures and their myriad political subdivisions. The mere recitation
of a benign or compensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification would
essentially entitle the States to exercise the full power of Congress under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial classificationfrom judicial
scrutiny under § 1.62

Accordingly, the plurality found that Fullilove's deference to congressional
power was not dispositive of the Court's review of state and local governmental

authority to enact similar set-aside programs.6"
57. Id. at 514 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens' continued
refusal to address this issue can be attributed to his observed "skeptic[ism] of discontinuously calibrated levels
of scrutiny and [his] corresponding[ ] confiden[ce] of his own ability to discern on a case-by-case basis when
racial classifications are and are not appropriate." Fried, supra note 2, at 126. This is strikingly reminiscent of
Justice Stewart's often remembered personal standard for reviewing obscenity cases: "I know it when I see it."
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). The obvious dilemma in this type ofjudicial
analysis, however, is that it provides absolutely no guidance to trial and appellate judges, requiring, at best, a
guess as to whether the Supreme Court would also "see" an equal protection violation in any given affirmative
action program. This approach to judicial review is further hindered by the inability to "discern [any] evident
pattern from the trajectory of Justice Stevens' dispositions" in his affirmative action opinions. Fried, supra note
2, at 126.
58. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511-12 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
59. Id. at 486-93.
60. Id. at 488.
61. Id. at 490.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 491. In his separate opinion, Justice Scalia also acknowledged the federal-state distinction implicated by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court's holding in Fullilove. Id. at 521-22 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). However, Justice Scalia thought it sufficient to note simply that Fullilove was not controlling "without revisiting what we held in Fullilove (or trying to derive a rationale from the three separate
opinions, none of which commanded more than three votes ....)." Id. at 522.
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Although joining all other aspects of her opinion, Justice Kennedy declined to
join in Justice O'Connor's discussion of Fullilove's significance.6 4 Justice
Kennedy argued that it was "difficult" to accept the proposition that Congress
was properly authorized to enact legislation which would otherwise violate equal
protection if enacted by a state or local government.6" Anticipating the subsequent debate on this subject in Metro Broadcastingand in Adarand, Justice
Kennedy stated that this issue was not before the Court, and that "any reconsideration of that issue must await some further case."66 For Justice Kennedy at
least, the continued validity of Fullilove remained an open question. 7
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, sharply
denounced the majority decision as "a deliberate and giant step backward in this
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence."6 6 The dissenters reiterated their consistently stated view that benign race conscious classifications should be subjected only to intermediate scrutiny, and castigated Croson's first-ever majority holding for strict scrutiny as "an unwelcome development."6 9 Justice O'Connor's
attempts to distinguish Fullilove through assertion of a distinction between state
and federal authority reflected in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment met
with equal criticism.7" Justice Marshall argued that, contrary to the plurality's
contention, "Fullilove did not view § 5 either as limiting the traditionally broad
powers of the States to fight discrimination, or as mandating a zero-sum game
in which state power wanes as federal power waxes."7 1 However, with hindsight afforded by the subsequent turn of events in Metro Broadcasting,the dissenters' complete rejection of Croson's federal-state distinction would indeed
prove ironic.

64. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
65. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Justice Kennedy's hesitation to join this aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion may also demonstrate his
recognition that the Fullilove-based distinction could potentially be used to create a differing standard of equal
protection review for federal, as opposed to state or local, affirmative action programs. This is, indeed, the
manner in which Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion was subsequently utilized by the Metro Broadcasting
majority. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
68. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 529 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 535, 551.
70. Id. at 557-58.
71. Id. at558. Moreover, Justice Marshall noted that four justices in Bakke had stressed that:
"[There is] no reason to conclude that the States cannot voluntarily accomplish under § I of the
Fourteenth Amendment what Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment validly may authorize or compel either the States or private persons to do. A contrary position would conflict with the
traditional understanding recognizing the competence of the States to initiate measures consistent
with federal policy in the absence of congressional preemption of the subject matter. Nothing whatever in the legislative history of either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act even
remotely suggests that the States are foreclosed from furthering the fundamental purpose of equal
opportunity to which the Amendment and those Acts are addressed.
Id. at 559-60 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 368 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
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D. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
Metro Broadcasting signaled an abrupt and, for many, astounding change of
course in the Court's continuing standard of review debate.72 At issue in Metro
Broadcasting were certain racial preferences of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) intended to increase minority ownership in the radio and
television broadcasting industry.73 In upholding these preferences, Metro
Broadcasting marked yet another "first" in the Court's debate, although poles
apart from the "first" achieved only eighteen months previous in Croson. For the
first time, a majority of the Court clearly subjected an affirmative action program to relaxed, or intermediate, scrutiny.74 The Croson dissenters - Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun - were joined by Justices Stevens and White
75
to create a new majority in Metro Broadcasting.
In stark contrast to the dissent
he joined in Croson, however, Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Metro
Broadcasting now fully embraced the Fullilove-based, federal state distinction
advanced by Justice O'Connor in Croson.
Indeed, as the Court's only prior case reviewing a federal affirmative action
measure, interpretation of Fullilove's rationale became a focal point for both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Metro Broadcasting. For example, citing
Fullilove's discussion of deference to congressional judgment, Justice Brennan
emphasized that it was of "overriding significance" that Congress had "approved
- indeed, mandated" the FCC's minority ownership programs.7" Justice Brennan
also placed substantial weight upon the fact that six Justices in Fullilove applied
something less than strict scrutiny review: the "close examination" called for by
the three justices in the Fullilove plurality; and intermediate scrutiny as advocated by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun in Fullilove, as they also did in
Bakke, Wygant, and Croson.77 Without attempting to reconcile these separate
standards of review, however, Justice Brennan simply announced that the intermediate review standard advocated by the three Croson dissenters in Fullilove is

72. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 44, at 127-28 (asserting that Metro Broadcasting represented a "significant" and "surprising" expansion of affirmative action; "[a]t the beginning of the 1989 term it seemed impossible that a majority of Justices would subscribe to such a far reaching decision").
73. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
74. See Fried, supra note 2, at 112 ("the Supreme Court had never, prior to Metro Broadcasting, clearly
applied relaxed scrutiny to race-conscious legislative measures").
75. Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 550.
76. Id. at 563.
77. Id. at 564. Quite tellingly, however, Justice Brennan chose to ignore the fact that the "searching review"
applied by Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Fullilove is far closer to strict scrutiny than intermediate,
including the familiar admonition that congressional action is constitutional only if "narrowly tailored" to meet
iis objectives. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980). This omission did not escape the notice of the
dissenters. See infra text accompanying notes 94-95.
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the standard "[w]e apply . . . today."78 The majority further declared, without

citation to any authority, that this newly announced standard would apply to all
"benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress - even if those measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of
past governmental or societal discrimination."79
Justice Brennan then seized upon the federal-state distinction in order to reconcile Metro Broadcasting'sresult with the previous Term's decision in Croson.
Citing to the opinions of Justices O'Connor and Scalia, Justice Brennan argued
that "much of the language and reasoning in Croson reaffirmed the lesson of
Fullilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by Congress to address
racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standardthan such
classifications prescribed by state and local governments."8 In other words, the
Metro Broadcastingmajority utilized both Fullilove and Croson's discussion and
interpretation of Fullilove to create dual standards for reviewing the constitutionality of racial classifications: one standard for Congress, and another standard
for classifications imposed by state or local governments.8 1 Numerous legal
commentators, however, have strongly questioned Justice Brennan's sincerity in
crafting a more deferential test for federal, as opposed to state or local, affirmative action programs.82 The consensus is that Justice Brennan, long a supporter
of across-the-board application of intermediate scrutiny to all affirmative action
measures, accepted the federal-state distinction only to hold the critical fifth vote
of Justice White, the only member of the Court to join both the Croson and
Metro Broadcastingmajorities.8 3

Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, dissented.8 4 Justice O'Connor argued that the proper standard of
review had been determined last Term in Croson, and that none of the Court's
precedents, Croson included, supported the majority's conclusion "that different

78. Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 564. As previously discussed, however, there was no majority in
Fullilove for any particular standard of review, and no single approach received more than three votes. See
supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the mere fact that a majority did not apply strict scrutiny in Fullilove is hardly precedential support for imposing intermediate scrutiny as the new test for reviewing
federal affirmative action programs. For that matter, a majority of the Justices in Fullilove also did not apply
intermediate scrutiny. As one commentator has noted, however, Fullilove was the only authority available to the
Metro Broadcastingmajority and thus was utilized in an attempt "[tlo avoid charges of having pulled the new
review standard out of thin air." Linder, supra note 18, at 300.
79. Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 564-65.
80. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
81. See Linder, supra note 18, at 301.
82. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 18, at 295-96 ("Justice Brennan did his best to justify the development of a
new test for federal affirmative action programs, but his heart was not in it."); Katz, supra note 20, at 336
(Justice Brennan's acceptance of federal-state distinction a "neat trick"); Fried, supra note 2, at 126-27
(although Justice Brennan offers "the Fullilove distinction in his opinion, one doubts whether he takes it, or
intends us to take it, seriously"; "[i]t is transparently clear that [Brennan] does not believe that the principles he
invokes are limited to Congress.").
83. See Katz, supra note 20, at 336; Linder, supra note 18, at 296, 316 17; Fried, supra note 2, at 126. Cf
Fried, supra note 44, at 20 (noting that Justice white joined the Metro Broadcastingmajority without comment,
even though Justice Brennan's opinion "was clearly, even provocatively, inconsistent with Croson"). But see
Devins, supra note 44, at 128 ("Metro Broadcastingexemplifies Brennan's ability to build coalitions that sacrifice doctrinal purity to achieve the desired outcome.").
84. Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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equal protection principles" applied to federal racial classifications.8" "The
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection binds the Federal Government as it
does the States, and no lower level of scrutiny applies to the Federal
Government's use of race classifications."8 8 In this regard, Justice O'Connor
asserted that Croson simply reaffirmed the Court's traditional safeguard against
discrimination - strict scrutiny - in reviewing racial classifications such as those
contained in the FCC's preference policies.8
Justice O'Connor next attacked the assertion that Fullilove, or her attempts to
distinguish Fullilove in Croson, supported the majority's "novel application of
intermediate scrutiny to 'benign' race conscious measures adopted by
Congress."88 First, Justice O'Connor argued that, despite Fullilove's references
to other sources of congressional authority, Croson had held that Fullilove was
primarily based upon Congress' "unique remedial powers" under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.89 As Justice O'Connor correctly noted, section 5 was
not implicated in Metro Broadcasting inasmuch as that provision empowers
Congress to act concerning the States and "this case concerns only the administration of federal programs by federal officials."9
Second, Justice O'Connor argued that, at most, Fullilove applied only to congressional action seeking to remedy identified past discrimination. 1 Indeed,
Fullilove emphasized that "careful review was essential to ensure that Congress
acted solely for remedial rather than other, illegitimate purposes."9 2 The dissent
asserted, therefore, that the Metro Broadcastingmajority could not properly use
Fullilove to extend its new standard of review to "racial classifications that are
not remedial in any sense."93 Finally, in contrast to Justice Brennan's observation
that a majority in Fullilove did not apply strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor
observed that six members of the Fullilove Court had also rejected intermediate
scrutiny in favor of a "more stringent form of review."94 As such, Fullilove could
not support the majority's adoption of intermediate scrutiny.9"
Metro Broadcastingwas Justice Brennan's last majority opinion before his
retirement in late 1990."9 The decision was both roundly criticized as reflecting
"suspect reasoning" and widely acclaimed as exemplifying Justice Brennan's
"consummate skill and brilliance" in building majority coalitions to achieve

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 603.
Id. at 604 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)).
Id. at 603.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 605-07.
Id. at 605-06.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 608.
Id.
See Katz, supra note 20, at 336.
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desired results. 7 Regardless of reaction to Metro Broadcasting'sremarkable
departure from Croson, however, the long-term health of Justice Brennan's final
majority opinion was called into serious doubt by his retirement.98 Indeed,
absent Justice Brennan's ability to hold together this fragile majority, support for
Metro Broadcasting'snew intermediate standard of review was, at best, precarious.
III. Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena
Justice Brennan's departure, however, would not be the sole factor influencing
renewed debate on the standard of review issue. To the contrary, the five year
gap between Metro Broadcastingand Adarand witnessed a dramatic turnover in
the Court's membership. Of the five members of the Metro Broadcastingmajority, only Justice Stevens remained. Gone were the trio of Justices - Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun - who, beginning with their 1978 dissent in Bakke, had
unwaveringly supported intermediate scrutiny of affirmative action. Gone also
was the crucial swing vote of Justice White as cast in both Croson and Metro
Broadcasting. A great deal of strength was retained on the other side of the
debate, however, as all four of Metro Broadcasting'sdissenting Justices remained
on the Court. Similar to the position previously occupied by Justice White,
therefore, the balance of power in this continuing debate might once again shift
based upon a single vote cast by any of the four new Justices joining the Court
betwen
Mtro roacastiigand zAdarandY 9
A. Background Summary
In September 1989, the Central Federal Lands Highway Division, a division of
the United States Department of Transportation ("DOT"), awarded a prime contract for construction of a federal highway project in Colorado to Mountain
Gravel & Construction Company."0 As required by section 502 of the Small
Business Act (the "Act"),10 1 the contract contained a "subcontractor compensa-

97. See Devins, supra note 44, at 128 and n.20, 155 (quoting Marcia Coyle, A Final Victory Marks the End
of a Career,NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at S4, col. 2).
98. See Devins, supra note 44, at 128 ("Metro Broadcasting'smonumental character may doom its prospects
for lasting precedential influence. The replacement of William Brennan with David Souter portends either an
extremely narrow reading of Metro Broadcastingor its outright reversal."); Linder, supra note 18, at 317 (In the
light of Justice Brennan's retirement, "resolution of the issue of review standards for affirmative action reached
in Metro may be temporary.").
99. The new members of the Court appointed during this period were Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Breyer.
100. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2102 (1995).
101. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 631-656 (West Supp. 1996).
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tion clause ' providing Mountain Gravel additional compensation for hiring
subcontractors certified as small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."'1 3 The Act creates a rebuttable presumption
that "Black Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native-Americans, Asian Pacific
Americans, and other minorities" are "socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals.""1 4 Following award of the prime contract, Mountain Gravel solicited bids for the guardrail portion of the contract. 105 Adarand Constructors, Inc., a
non-minority firm, submitted the low bid.10 ' However, Mountain Gravel awarded
the guardrail subcontract to Gonzales Construction Company, a higher bidder
certified as a disadvantaged business enterprise under the Act."0 7 Mountain
Gravel subsequently testified that Adarand's bid would have been accepted over
that of Gonzales but for the additional compensation received for hiring
Gonzales.1"8
Adarand sued the DOT, contending that providing financial incentives to hire
"socially and economically disadvantaged" subcontractors utilizing the Act's
race-based presumptions violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the DOT. 9 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the Supreme Court's
decision in Fullilove controlling. 1 0 The Tenth Circuit held that "[u]nder
Fullilove, if Congress has expressly mandated a race-conscious program, a court
must apply a lenient standard,resembling intermediate scrutiny, in assessing the
program's constitutionality.""' Moreover, citing Metro Broadcasting, the court
emphasized that "[tihe lesson we glean from Fullilove and Croson is that the fed-

102. This clause provided as follows:
Subcontracting. This subsection is supplemented to include a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
(DBE) Development and Subcontracting Provision as follows:
Monetary compensation is offered for awarding subcontracts to small business concerns owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals ....
A small business concern will be considered a DBE after it has been certified as such by the U.S.
Small Business Administration or any State Highway Agency. Certification by other Government
agencies, counties, or cities may be acceptable on an individual basis provided the Contracting
Officer has determined the certifying agency has an acceptable and viable DBE certification program. If the Contractor requests payment under this provision, the Contractor shall furnish the engineer with acceptable evidence of the subcontractor(s) DBE certification and shall furnish one certified copy of the executed subcontract(s).
The Contractor will be paid an amount computed as follows:
1. If a Subcontract is awarded to one DBE, 10 percent of the final amount of the approved DBE
subcontract, not to exceed 1.5 percent of the original contract amount.
2. If subcontracts are awarded to two or more DBE's, 10 percent of the final amount of the
approved DBE subcontracts, not to exceed 2 percent of the original contract amount.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103-04.
103. Id. at 2102.
104. 15 U.S.C.A. § 637(d)(2), (3) (West Supp. 1996).
105. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 E Supp. 240, 245 (D. Colo. 1992), rev d sub nom., Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
110. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 E3d 1537, 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995).
111. Id. at 1544 (emphasis added).
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eral government, acting under congressional authority, can engage more freely in
affirmative action than states and localities."11 Metro Broadcasting'sdual standards had quite clearly taken hold in the lower courts.
B. The Holding and Rationale of Adarand
On appeal to the Supreme Court, however, the Metro Broadcasting dissenters
found their critical fifth vote in the person of Justice Thomas. By a 5-4 vote,
therefore, this new majority swiftly dismantled Metro Broadcasting's short-lived
dual standards for judicial review of affirmative action measures. As in Croson
and Metro Broadcasting,Justice O'Connor once again took center stage in this
long-standing debate.
Writing for the Adarand majority, Justice O'Connor initially sought to repair
the damage to application of strict scrutiny to all governmental racial classifications precipitated by her attempts to distinguish Fullilove in the plurality portion
of her Croson opinion. Clearly mindful of Justice Brennan's use of this distinction in Metro Broadcasting,Justice O'Connor announced that the Adarand Court
would "revisit the issue" of the respective equal protection obligations of the federal and state governments imposed under the Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.113 Through a lengthy, historical tour of the Court's previous equal
protection cases, Justice O'Connor emphasized that, since the mid-1970s, a virtually identical equal protection obligation had been imposed on the federal government as that imposed on the States.' u Justice O'Connor further assertled that,
indeed, many of the Court's equal protection decisions in this regard had not indicated even the "possibility" of different standards for state and federal action.' 15
Justice O'Connor recognized, however, that the Court's equal protection decisions had primarily involved invidious governmental racial classifications, as
opposed to race-conscious governmental action designed to benefit, rather than
hinder, groups historically the target of harmful discrimination."' Therefore,
Justice O'Connor next undertook to review the Court's lengthy debate - extending from Bakke through Metro Broadcasting- over the proper level of equal protection review for affirmative action measures." 7 Not surprisingly, Croson was
the focal point for this analysis:
With Croson, the Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and local governments. But
Croson of course had no occasion to declare what standard of review the Fifth
Amendment requires for such action taken by the Federal Government. Croson
observed simply that the Court's "treatment of an exercise of congressional
112. Id. at 1545.
113. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2106 (1995).
114. Id. at2107. For example, Justice O'Connor referenced the express statement of this principle in
Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975), in which the Court observed that "[tihis Court's
approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 2108.
115. Id. at 2107-08.
116. Id. at2108.
117. Id.at2108-12.
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power in Fullilove cannot be dispositive here," because Croson's facts did not
implicate Congress' broad power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."1 8
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor also acknowledged that Croson had, in fact, generated "lingering uncertainty" concerning the appropriate standard of review for
federal affirmative action. 19
Before turning her attention to the Court's recent decision in Metro
Broadcasting, however, Justice O'Connor carefully paused to summarize her
review of the Court's equal protection and affirmative action decisions through
Croson. In this regard, Justice O'Connor argued that, by the time Metro
Broadcasting reached the Court, the Court's previous decisions had firmly established "three general propositions":
(1) "skepticism" - recognition that racial classifications are inherently suspect
and thus subject to a "most searching" judicial examination;
(2) "consistency" - the understanding that the proper standard of equal protection review is unaffected by "the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification"; and
(3) "congruence" - recognition that the Court's approach to equal protection
analysis under the Fifth Amendment concerning the federal government is "the
same" as that applied to state and local governments under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 '
Justice O'Connor asserted that these ideas had been long considered "central to
th[e] Court's understanding of equal protection." '2 1 Accordingly, Justice
O'Connor stressed that, considered together, these principles necessarily "lead to
the conclusion that any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scruti1 22
ny.'
The stage was thus set for Metro Broadcasting's outright reversal. Justice
O'Connor argued that Metro Broadcasting's "surprising". adoption of intermediate scrutiny to review "benign" federal racial classifications represented a significant departure from the Court's prior affirmative action cases.1 23 In this regard,
Justice O'Connor accused the Metro Broadcastingmajority of "turn[ing] its back
on Croson's explanation of why strict scrutiny of all governmental racial classifi-

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 2110.
Id. at 2111.
Id.
Id. at2113.
Id. at 2111, 2113.
Id. at 2112.
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'
Additionally, the Court found that Metro Broadcasting
cations is essential."124
"squarely rejected" one of the three propositions established by the Court's previous decisions: "congruence between the standards applicable to federal and state
racial classifications. 1 25 Indeed, the Adarand majority found that Metro
Broadcasting wholly "repudiated" the Court's "long-held notion" that the
the federal government than on the States
Constitution imposes no lesser duty on
126
to insure equal protection of the laws.
The Adarand Court further found that Metro Broadcasting's departure from
"congruence" seriously undermined the Court's other established equal protection principles: "skepticism" and "consistency."1 21 In other words, Metro
Broadcastingtreated certain racial classifications (i.e., "benign" federal classifications) with less "skepticism" than others, and had ignored "consistency of
treatment" by making the race of the benefited group a critical factor in determining the proper standard of equal protection review. 128 Justice O'Connor
asserted, however, that the three propositions identified in Adarand all derived
from the basic principle that constitutional equal protection is intended to "protect persons, not groups." '29 Application of strict scrutiny was best suited to
insure non-infringement of this "personalright to equal protection.""13
Accordingly, the Adarand majority held that:

all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. To the extent
that Metro Broadcastingis inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled. 13
The Court further observed that, "to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal
racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is [also] no
' 132
longer controlling."

124. Id. Quoting from Croson, Justice O'Connor reemphasized:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race based measures, there is simply
no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are
in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simply racial politics. Indeed, the
purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also
ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
125. Id. at 2112.
126. Id. at2111-12.
127. Id. at2112.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2112-13. Accord Fried, supra note 2, at 107-10 (emphasizing the conflict between the "grouprights" and "individualistic" equal protection perspectives on the Court).
130. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id. at2117.
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C. The Dissenters'Rebuttal
The task of responding to the Adarand majority's seizure of control in the standard of review debate was entrusted to Justice Stevens, the last remaining member of the Metro Broadcastingmajority. In a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Stevens sharply criticized the majority's analysis for failing to substantively incorporate the dichotomy between (1) "benign" and "invidious" discrimination and (2) federal and state action. 3 In Justice Stevens' view, these essential
distinctions were "obscured" through the majority's application of "doctrinaire"
notions such as "consistency" and "congruence."13' 4
Similar to his previous affirmative action opinions, however, Justice Stevens'
Adarand dissent reflects his deeply-rooted distrust of structured standards of any
type in affirmative action cases. 3 For example, Justice Stevens admonished that
"uniform standards are often anything but uniform.""13
He further emphasized
that, "[w]hen a court becomes preoccupied with abstract standards, it risks sacrificing common sense at the altar of formal consistency." 137 Such statements
clearly reflect Justice Stevens' rejection of rigid, formalized tests for reviewing
governmental racial classifications in favor of a case-by-case "common sense"
approach closely akin to a subjective rational basis test. 38 This view, more than
any long-standing commitment to intermediate scrutiny for affirmative action,
motivates Justice Stevens' disagreement with the "consistency" principle incorporated into the Adarand majority's strict scrutiny analysis.
In this vein, Justice Stevens' dissent chastises the majority as follows:
The ...explanation for treating dissimilar race-based decisions as though they
were equally objectionable is a supposed inability to differentiate between
"invidious" and "benign" discrimination. But the term "affirmative action" is
common and well understood. Its presence in every day parlance9 shows that
13
people understand the difference between good intentions and bad.
Said another way, Justice Stevens contends that the ability to "understand" the
difference between right and wrong, or between "good" and "bad" discrimination, is the only tool necessary for judicial review of affirmative action measures.
Such a completely unbridled, results oriented approach, however, provides a poor
foundation for constitutional analysis. 4 Instead of dual standards of review,
Justice Stevens' approach would create as many different standards of review as
exist judges in the American legal system.

133. Id. at 2120-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters also strongly criticized the majority's failure to
adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis in overruling Metro Broadcasting. See id.at 2126-28; id. at 2132
(Souter, J., dissenting). Especially in constitutional cases, however, fidelity to stare decisis seems most dependent upon whose ox is being gored at that particular moment. See also Linder, supra note 18, at 317 and n. 161.
134. Id. at 2123.
135. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
136. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2120 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
137. Id. at 2122.
138. See Fried, supra note 2, at 126.
139. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2121 (citation omitted).
140. See supra note 57.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW RE VIEW

[VOL. 16:2

Justice Stevens' disdain for structured standards of review also ignores the fundamental difference between determining the proper standard and judicial application of that standard. As Justice O'Connor's Adarand opinion emphasizes:
The principle of consistency simply means that whenever the government treats
any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an
injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection. It says nothing about the ultimate validity of any
particularlaw; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scruti-

ny. The principal of consistency explains the circumstances in which the injury
requiring strict scrutiny occurs. The application of strict scrutiny, in turn, detera compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction of that
mines whether
41
injury'
In other words, simply trusting the judiciary's ability to distinguish "good" discrimination from "bad" wholly ignores competing equal protection concerns
implicated even in the context of so-called "benign" governmental racial classifications. Establishing strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard reflects recognition of these competing concerns as well as fidelity to equal protection's most
fundamental principle - governmental decision making should be independent of
race. On the other hand, government may at times have legitimate (i.e., compelling) interests in engaging in race-conscious decision making. Strict scrutiny
requires a reviewing court to recognize and uphold such legitimate governmental
interests during application of this standard.
Even those favoring across-the-board application of intermediate scrutiny to all
affirmative action programs may be disappointed with Justice Stevens' "I know it
when I see it" approach to equal protection review.14 z This approach is certainly
a weak successor to the forceful arguments for intermediate scrutiny first
advanced by Justice Marshall in Bakke as a means of responding to continuing
racial discrimination in America.' 43 Indeed, none of the dissenting opinions in
Adarand produced a clear champion for the intermediate scrutiny position advocated for nearly three decades by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun.
Whether a stronger proponent of intermediate scrutiny for affirmative action
measures will eventually emerge on the current Court must await the outcome of
future cases. Until then, the reappearance of a majority coalition similar to that
formed in Metro Broadcastingseems exceedingly remote.
IV WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR APPLICATION OF STRICT
SCRUTINY TO FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?

Despite Justice O'Connor's observations concerning the importance of the
Court's lengthy standard of review debate,144 significant concerns were left unan141. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114 (emphasis added).
142. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 20, at 354-58 (strongly advocating "[i]termediate scrutiny .. to judge all
remedial or benign classifications that burden, or impinge upon, a previously privileged class: privileged
because of economic class, race, gender, ethnicity or disability").
143. See id. at 356.
144. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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swered by the Adarandmajority which remain to be addressed. Most importantly, although strict scrutiny is now the required standard for review of all governmental racial classifications, the question remains whether deference to Congress
will play any future role in actual application of strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs. Indeed, Adarand expressly leaves the door open to such a
possibility. Responding to Justice Stevens' charge that the majority had ignored
the essential distinction between federal and state government, Justice O'Connor
emphasized that:
requiring .

.

. Congress, like the States, [to] enact racial classifications only

when doing so is necessary to further a "compelling interest" does not contravene any principle of appropriate respect for a co-equal Branch of the
Government. It is true that various Members of this Court have taken different
views of the authority § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress
to deal with the problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which courts
should defer to Congress' exercise of that authority. We need not, and do not,
address these differences today. 4 '

The majority's failure to provide any guidance on how, or whether, the lower
courts should address this essential question is puzzling, especially given their
remand of Adarand to the trial court for an initial determination of whether the
federal program at issue satisfies strict scrutiny.'46 This unresolved issue will
undoubtedly be the subject of much future debate and may eventually require
resolution by the Supreme Court.
In his concurring opinion in Fullilove, Justice Powell determined that the racebased federal subcontracting provision at issue satisfied strict scrutiny review.'47
Justice Powell's application of the strict scrutiny standard, however, was tempered
in large part by deference to Congress' authority to redress racial discrimination
under the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 48
In this regard, Justice Powell noted that:
I believe that Congress' choice of a remedy should be upheld ... if the means
selected are equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to exercise necessary discretion
but preserves the essential safeguard of judicial review of racial classifications.

'

Under this approach, deference to Congress is not considered in the first step of
a court's review; that is, determining which equal protection standard to apply.
Instead, the appropriateness of deferring to congressional judgment is evaluated
only after the standard is selected. In other words, deference to Congress only
plays a role during actual application of strict scrutiny to the affirmative action
measure in question.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
Id.at2118.
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508-10 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 510.
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In her creation of a federal-state distinction in Croson, Justice O'Connor did
not fully explore Justice Powell's application of strict scrutiny in Fullilove, nor
the manner in which deference to Congress factored into his separate opinion.
This is certainly not surprising. Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion clearly
intended only to reject the proposition that state and local legislatures were entitled to the same deference previously afforded the federal legislature by the
Croson's failure to fully develop Justice Powell's strict
Fullilove plurality.'
scrutiny position, however, permitted Justice Brennan in Metro Broadcasting to
capitalize on the federal-state distinction in a manner not supported by Fullilove.
Specifically, Justice Brennan was able to utilize Fullilove's discussion of deference to congressional judgment as an element in determining the appropriate
review standard, rather than simply as an additional factor for consideration in
the actual application of the standard."5 ' While clearly rejecting deference to
Congress as an aspect in determining which equal protection standard to apply,
Adarand simultaneously leaves the door open for the lower courts to adopt
Justice Powell's approach of incorporating such deference into the actual application of strict scrutiny.'5 2 Only time will tell whether this door will also eventually
be shut by the Adarandmajority.
Commentators have long suggested that the standard of review in equal protection cases is outcome determinative, and that strict scrutiny is an essentially inThis suggestion
surmountable obstacle: "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." '
was echoed by Justice Powell in Fullilove during his independent review of the
federal program at issue under strict scrutiny. 54 Significantly, however, Justice
O'Connor took affirmative steps in Adarand to "dispel" this notion. 5 "The
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
government is not disqualified from acting in response to it."1 By way of
example, Justice O'Connor emphasized that "every Justice" had supported a
"narrowly tailored" remedy for pervasive governmental racial discrimination as
1 7
recently as the Court's 1987 decision in UnitedStates v. Paradise.1
Searching for Adarand's silver lining, Justice Ginsburg's separate dissent carefully highlighted this portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion. 5 8 However,

150. See supranotes 40-43 and accompanying text.
151. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
152. In a dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice Souter appears to recognize this possibility,
asserting that on remand the Adarand majority's view of strict scrutiny "will presumably be applied as Justice
Powell employed it" in Fullilove. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2134 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
153. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
ChangingCourt: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAR. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
154. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("the failure of legislative
action to survive strict scrutiny has led some to wonder whether our review of racial classifications has been
strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
155. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
156. Id.
157. 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
158. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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whether there is any substance to Adarand's optimistic declaration that establishing strict scrutiny as the applicable standard is not necessarily outcome determinative remains to be seen. Again, much depends upon whether future court decisions applying strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action substantially follow the
road map made applicable to state and local governments in Croson,59 or
whether the door left open in Adarand results in a less stringent application of
strict scrutiny for programs mandated by Congress.
V CONCLUSION

Adarand seemingly ends the Court's decades-long debate over which standard
of equal protection review governs race-conscious affirmative action programs.
However, for strict scrutiny proponents to declare victory and assert that Adarand
is the final word in this lengthy debate would be both imprudent and premature.
Imprudent because one need look no further than the Court's dramatic turnover
in membership between Metro Broadcasting and Adarand to realize that the
retirement of key Justices and the constantly shifting winds of political fortune
could rapidly lead to a new majority coalition with very different ideological
views on affirmative action. 6 Premature, of course, because of the critical
question acknowledged, but not answered, in Adarand. That is, will future application of strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action be softened by rules permitting judicial deference for review of congressionally-mandated programs? When
that question is conclusively resolved, Justice O'Connor's hopeful assertion that
strict scrutiny of such programs is no longer "fatal in fact" can then be fully and
finally evaluated.
159. For a discussion of the application of strict scrutiny to state and local affirmative action measures following Croson, see Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of Strict
Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 679 (1995).
160. For a discussion of the politicization of the judicial branch, particularly in the federal appointment
process, see James L. Robertson, Of Bork and Basics, 60 Miss. L.J. 439 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERiCA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)), and David W Case, In Search of

an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to Judicial Elections in Mississippi, 13 Miss. C. L. REv. 1, 21-22, 29
(1992).

